[I]t is common now to address theoretical issues through the examination of bodies of naturally occurring language use. (Bybee 2006: 712) 1. Corpus linguistics and (more) theoretical approaches �e relation between corpus linguistics (CL) and linguistic theory has traditionally been somewhat problematic. I think there are two reasons for this:
[…] corpus linguistics is a whole system of methods and principles of how to apply corpora in language studies and teaching/learning, it certainly has a theoretical status. Yet theoretical status is not theory in itself (McEnery et al. 2006: 7f.) As a corpus linguist I consider myself primarily a methodologist and CL primarily a methodology, to be applied to whatever theory seems most appropriate for the task at hand (Hardie 2 )
Yet other corpus linguists (e.g. Aarts 2002 , Teubert 2005 , Williams 2006 ) use other labels such as discipline or what I would call a methodological commitment: " [CL] is rather an insistence on working only with real language data taken from the discourse in a principled way and compiled into a corpus" (Teubert 2005: 4) . Whether scholars attribute the status of theory to CL or not o�en somewhat coincides with where they are on the continuum of corpus-driven and corpusbased linguistics. Corpus-driven linguists − aim to build theory from scratch, completely free from pre-corpus theoretical premises; − base theories exclusively on corpus data; − o�en reject corpus annotation (as a pre-corpus theoretical commitment).
Corpus-driven linguistics, in essence, means 'bottom-up' . �e following quote by Teubert (2005: 4) is instructive:
While corpus linguistics may make use of the categories of traditional linguistics, it does not take them for granted. It is the discourse itself, and not a languageexternal taxonomy of linguistic entities, which will have to provide the categories and classi�cations that are needed to answer a given research question.
Corpus-based linguists approach corpus data with moderate corpus-external premises, with the aim of testing and improving such theories, and o�en use corpus annotation. I myself am more of a corpus-based linguist and consider CL "a major methodological paradigm in applied and theoretical linguistics" (Gries 2006: 191) . Why? First, I agree with Aarts, who coined the term corpus linguistics, but is also reported as commenting that the term was coined with some hesitation "because we thought (and I still think) that it was not a very good name: it is an odd discipline that is called by the name of its major research tool and data source. " (Taylor 2008: 179) Put di�erently, I don't accord CL the status of a theory just as I don't think there is a theory called experimental linguistics or self-paced reading time linguistics even though, just like corpus-based results, results from self-paced reading times may call into question units/structures/processes assumed in the kind of formal linguistics that (some of) CL was a reaction against. Second, with the exception of, maybe, Sinclair and Mauranen's Linear Unit Grammar, I have yet to see a truly corpus-driven approach. Even self-proclaimed corpus-driven studies are o�en not as corpus-driven as they could/claim to be, which can be seen on di�erent levels: i. From a theoretical perspective, a truly corpus-driven approach would, strictly speaking, require a complete distributional analysis of the corpus (with maybe some machine-learning algorithm/neural network) to initially identify the linguistic units manifested in the data (as in, say, C.C. Fries's approach). And while some corpus linguists make statements to that e�ect (cf. Teubert's "Corpus linguists still don't know what a morpheme, a word, a phrase or a pattern is. " 3 ), − many corpus-driven studies start out from some notion of a word; − Bill Louw (2000) shows a concordance of all sorts of, and my guess is he has not �rst used a bottom-up or even replicable algorithm to ensure that all sorts of is in fact a unit; − POS are not uncommon in so-called corpus-driven studies (cf. Xiao 2009: 995;  Linear Unit Grammar at least starts out without POS); − even Halliday (2005: 174) , revered by many corpus-driven linguists, writes "a corpus-driven grammar is not one that is theory-free", referring to Hunston & Francis (2000) and Tognini-Bonelli (2001) . Xiao (2009: 995) summarizes the problems of corpus-driven linguistics persuasively: "applying intuitions when classifying concordances may simply be an implicit annotation process, which unconsciously makes use of preconceived theory", and this implicit annotation is "to all intents and purposes unrecoverable and thus more unreliable than explicit annotation".
ii. From a more concrete perspective, the corpus-driven approach is also not always really corpus-driven. For example, many corpus-driven studies look at n-grams, where n is arbitrarily de�ned as one number (currently, n=4 is en vogue), but most studies do not − check whether that n is indeed the best number for all n-grams; as one of few exceptions, Biber (2009) checks for 5-grams; − check whether it would not indeed be better to have di�erent n's for di�erent n-grams (cf. Kita et al. 1994 , Mason 2006 , and Mukherjee & Gries 2009 on varying length n-grams); − even consider discontinuous n-grams (e.g. Nagao & Mori 1994) .
iii. From a register perspective: Halliday (2005: 66) wrote "Register variation can in fact be de�ned as systematic variation in probabilities; a register is a tendency to select certain combinations of meanings with certain frequencies". I agree, but with regard to much corpus-driven work the register distinctions in a corpus may not be most useful from a truly bottom-up perspective (cf. Gries forthcoming, ).
Comparing corpus-driven and corpus-based linguistics, Xiao (2009) states "the distinction between the two is overstated" and that "the corpus-based approach is better suited to contributing to linguistic theory". As to the former, I disagree -if anything, it is understated given that truly corpus-driven work seems a myth at best. �e latter I �nd interesting because in e�ect it says that corpus-driven linguistics, where scholars use corpus-driven characteristics to argue for corpus linguistics as a theory, is in fact less suited to contributing to linguistic theory than corpus-based linguistics, which o�en views corpus linguistics as a method(ology) 'only' . Turning to what we and scholars from other disciplines see from, and think about, each other, I think there are several things that make corpus linguistics less attractive to the observer from theoretical linguistics (apart from very time-consuming retrieval and coding operations). �ese include some corpus linguists' i. rather "unusual" ideas about potentially relevant neighboring disciplines; ii. rather "unusual" ways of defending their perspective(s); iii. rather "unusual" ideas about the nature of the discipline (above and beyond the above issues).
I cannot discuss all these issues in detail so some examples must su�ce. As for (i), − Teubert (this volume) characterizes the relation between NLP and cognitive linguistics (CogLing) as follows: NLP is one of CogLing's "illegitimate o�spring[s]". �is just leaves me ba�ed. I fail to see any connection between these �elds other than that Teubert does not want CL to be like either of them, and neither do, I think, most members of these two disciplines. I don't see cognitive linguistics papers in Computational Linguistics or the many di�er-ent proceedings in which computational linguists publish, nor do I see NLP papers in Cognitive Linguistics. − In a generally interesting paper, Mason (2007: 2) argues in favor of Linear Unit Grammar:
"Formal approaches to the description of sentence structure furthermore take for granted a hierarchical (phrase) structure, […] . However, language is not produced in that way, but instead is a linear sequence created in stops and starts. A hierarchical structure thus cannot account for the fact that the beginning of an utterance is already produced before the whole sentence has been completely worked out. Similar issues apply for the reception of language. Unlike the hierarchical, a linear approach is more closely related to the way most language is received. Processing usually begins before a complete sentence has been heard or read, and quite o�en the remaining parts of a sentence can be predicted with high accuracy before its completion".
�is betrays a serious misunderstanding of psycholinguistic approaches to language production and comprehension: An incremental approach to language production and comprehension does by no means require abandoning a largely hierarchical view of language structure (cf. Hawkins's 1994 Hawkins's , 2005 or G. Kempen's work). A looser de�nition of constituency may be useful to increase the range of units that are manipulated in comprehension and production to include (linear) multi-word units etc. but that does not mean such units cannot still be analyzed hierarchically.
As for (ii), − I �nd that, for instance, Fillmore's polarization of arm-chair linguists vs. corpus linguists is too o�en taken way too seriously: theoretical linguists need (corpus) data, but CL also needs (more) theory. − Discourse with and about (more) theoretical linguistics is o�en characterized by a strange us vs. them gate-keeping warfare that (i) uses geographical labels in place of arguments (as when agendas are simply labeled as "transatlantic"), that (ii) contrasts (good) old-fashioned Sinclairian core corpus linguistics with those who "piss into" 4 Sinclair's canonical corpus linguistics tent and use corpora in "a seemingly inappropriate, toolbox-like, inherently nonSinclairian way" (Mukherjee, 5 characterizing the viewpoint he opposes), that (iii) couches interdisciplinary discourse in terms of "hijacking" (Teubert, this volume) and "takeover bid[s]" (Williams, this volume). 6 As for (iii), − "corpus linguistics looks at phenomena which cannot be explained by recourse to general rules and assumptions" (Teubert 2005: 5) Linguistics is not a science like the natural sciences whose remit is the search for 'truth' . It belongs to the humanities, and as such it is a part of the endeavour to make sense of the human condition. Interpretation, and not veri�cation, is the proper response to the quest for meaning.
I don't see how blanking out the very thing that makes us human -mind/ Geist -helps in the endeavor to make sense of the human condition…
Taking stock…
None of this must distract from the fact that CL has le� quite a mark on linguistics in general and theoretical linguistics in particular. However, I think CL can bene�t from more interaction because many take the above delimitation(s) of the �eld too literally and develop tools/methods that may appear useful when applied with the we-never-talk-about-anything-other-than-the-discourse(s) perspective but that hardly get validated against anything outside the discourses. For example, there are 20+ measures of dispersion but few corpus linguists try to determine which are best in which circumstances (exceptions include Lyne 1985 and Gries 2008 ). For example, there are many di�erent ways to generate n-grams, but few corpus linguists try to determine which of these ways result in something corresponding to something outside of the narrow con�nes of the discourses. For example, there are 30-something of measures of collocational strength, but not only do few corpus linguists try to determine which are best when (Evert & Krenn 2005 and Wiechmann 2008 are laudable exceptions), there are now also corpus linguists who pretty much argue for trying di�erent ways to modify existing measures and pick whatever yields results that intuitively (!) appear best and then sell that functionality as part of an unvalidated commercial web-based package. �ese facts are troubling because such validations are so necessary as studies di�er with regard to which, say, measures of attraction yield the best results: Krug (1998) �nds string frequency to be most predictive; Gries et al. (2005) �nd p Fisher-Yates to be best; Wiechmann (2008) gets the best results with minimum sensitivity, etc. �us, do we as corpus linguists just go on using MI (or t or …) just because we're supposed to focus on the discourse only and because the WordSketch engine makes that easy? Don't we care there are psycholinguistic results available that bear on our choice of statistics?
Obviously, I think we should and, thus, CL would bene�t from applying corpus methods outside of CL and its discourses proper, because that would increase CL's visibility in linguistics as a whole and in disciplines that have o�en independently arrived at similar conclusions, but also because external validation would streamline corpus-linguistic research. Butler (2004) argues that, contrary to what Sinclair believed, CL should not and need not be non-cognitive. A similar plea for the coming together of CL and cognitive approaches is made by Hoey (2005: 7) , who states the need for a "greater awareness in corpus linguistics of the need for a more powerful and cognitively valid theory". However, if that is so, which theory should CL turn to?
By now it has become obvious that I disagree with most of Teubert's opinions, which is why one can turn to him to guess which theory I have in mind. Here are some instructive quotes:
− "For me, corpus linguistics and cognitive linguistics are two complementary, but ultimately irreconcilable paradigms " (2005: 8) . − "Corpus linguistics localises the study of language, once again, �rmly and deliberately, in the Geisteswissenscha�en, the humanities" (2005: 13). − "Corpus linguistics looks at language from a social perspective. It is not concerned with the psychological aspects of language" (2005: 2f.).
Adding up all this brings me to a psycholinguistically informed, (cognitively-inspired) usage-based linguistics which should be located, �rmly and deliberately, in the social/behavioral sciences. 7 And in some sense, that is the logical choice. First, as we're talking about the humanistic perspective and the Geisteswissenscha�en, isn't illuminating the cognitive system(s) that ultimately give rise to discourse(s) telling us much more about the 'human condition' than interrelations between text �les? Again, how can we seriously be in the Geisteswissenscha�en if the one thing we a priori blank out is Geist?! Second, at some point of time, going cognitive is necessary: things only enter into discourse when a speaker has processed them and "decided" to utter them and, thus, make them part of the discourse, and the way a hearer processes that input is also determined by that hearer's internal structure. As Maxwell put it: 8 I would have thought that meaning was not inherent in any corpus, nor in some community's use of language, but could only be understood (bad term, but I can't think of another) with reference to the individual minds of the people using that language (cf. Washtell 9 for a similar statement) �us, a psycho-and cognitive-linguistically informed usage-based linguistics it is. But how does this �eld relate to CL?
At a recent conference devoted to modern developments in corpus studies I was struck by the way that a number of speakers at the conference were setting up an opposition between 'corpus linguistics' and 'theoretical linguistics' -not a con�ict, I mean, but a distinction, as if these were members of two distinct species. I commented on this at the time, saying that I found it strange because corpus linguistics seemed to me to be, potentially at least, a highly theoretical pursuit. (Halliday 2005: 130) 2. Corpus linguistics and one particular (more) theoretical approach i. When corpus linguists talk about token frequencies, − cognitive linguists become interested because, on the whole, token frequencies correlate with degree of entrenchment (Schmid 2000) ; with phonetic reduction and development of new forms (Fidelholtz 1975 , Bybee & �ompson 1997 , Bybee & Scheibman 1999 ; with resistance to morphosyntactic language change (Bybee & �ompson 1997) , etc.; − psycholinguists become interested because, on the whole, token frequencies correlate with ease/earliness of acquisition (Casenhiser & Goldberg 2005) ; with lexical decision tasks, word naming, picture naming (Howes & Solomon 1951 , Forster & Chambers 1973  iv. When corpus linguists argue against a strict separation of syntax and lexis, cognitive linguists agree, and many psycholinguists have long assumed that words and syntactic patterns are represented as qualitatively similar nodes in a network where, in production, lexical and syntactic nodes are activated when they �t the semantic/pragmatic meaning to be communicated. v. When corpus linguists talk about the Idiom Principle ("a language user has available to him or her a large number of semi-preconstructed phrases that constitute single choices, even though they might appear to be analysable into segments" (Sinclair 1991: 110) ), cognitive linguistics become interested because it reminds them of − Langacker's (1987: 57) 'unit' , "a structure that a speaker has mastered quite thoroughly, to the extent that he can employ it in largely automatic fashion, without having to focus his attention speci�cally on its individual parts for their arrangement […] he has no need to re�ect on how to put it together". − Langacker's (2000: 2) 'rule-list fallacy': " [t] here is a viable alternative: to include in the grammar both the rules and instantiating expressions. �is option allows any valid generalizations to be captured (by means of rules), and while the descriptions it a�ords may not be maximally economical, they have to be preferred on grounds of psychological accuracy to the extent that speci�c expressions do in fact become established as well-rehearsed units. Such units are cognitive entities in their own right whose existence is not reducible to that of the general patterns they instantiate". vi. when corpus linguists talk about words and patterns, psycholinguists become interested because when something attains unit status it can prime and be primed (both lexically and syntactically), and cognitive linguists become interested because Hunston and Francis's patterns are very similar to Goldberg's constructions:
�e patterns of a word can be de�ned as all the words and structures which are regularly associated with the word and contribute to its meaning. A pattern can be identi�ed if a combination of words occurs relatively frequently, if it is dependent on a particular word choice, and if there is a clear meaning associated with it. (Hunston & Francis 2000: 37) Any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its component parts or other constructions recognized to exist. In addition, patterns are stored as constructions even if they are fully predictable as long as they occur with su�cient frequency. (Goldberg 2006: 5) vii. when corpus linguists talk about concordances, collocations, n-grams, colligations -i.e. anything having to do with co-occurrence information -psycholinguists become interested because such co-occurrence information − helps children discern phonotactic patterns (Sa�ran et al. 1996) ; − can predict reading times (MacDonald 1993) and gaze duration (McDonald et al. 2001 ); − helps subjects recognize frequent 4-grams faster (when 1-gram and 2-gram frequency is controlled) (Snider & Arnon, in progress) ;
In addition, language production and comprehension have been shown to be highly item-speci�c, which is just another way of saying context-bound (e.g. lexicallyspeci�c reduction or priming e�ects). In an ironic twist, many of these approaches are therefore more corpus-driven than much self-proclaimed corpus-driven work, as when Reddington et al. (1998) and Mintz et al. (2002) apply nearly completely bottom-up cluster algorithms to corpus data to explain children's recognition of parts of speech. Also, in conformity with Teubert's social perspective, Cro� (2009) and others are now arguing for a cognitive sociolinguistics, and Construction Grammar even explicitly allows for such a connection: "the function pole in the de�nition of a construction indeed allows for the incorporation of factors pertaining to social situation, such as e.g. register" (Goldberg 2003: 221) . �ere is also increasingly more work in CogLing relying on corpora. �ere were several theme sessions on corpus-related topics at several recent CogLing conferences, and more than half of all papers in the next proceedings of the American version of the CogLing conference use corpora. Similarly, more and more psycholinguistic work utilizes corpora, as can be seen by searching for the words corpus/corpora on, say, the website of the Journal of Memory and Language.
Taking stock again …
Obviously, CL is concerned with many things having immediate psycholinguistic and/or cognitive-linguistic relevance, but it becomes just as clear that it is o�en linguists outside of CL that apply our methods, demonstrate their relevance to notions/data outside of the 'discourses' , and validate the suggestions we've made. It follows that not only can CL bene�t from relating to more of what happens in these "irreconcilably di�erent" disciplines, but that these disciplines have developed theories and models that allow us to move from the purely descriptive approach for which CL is o�en criticized to explanation, prediction, and the embedding into a larger context, or theory, or model. �e kind of cognitive-linguistic/ psycholinguistic model many of the above studies come with is an exemplar-based approach, in which each instance rede�nes the system, however in�nitesimally, maintaining its present state or shi�ing its probabilities in one direction or the other (Halliday 2005: 67) each learning event updates a statistical representation of a category independently of other learning events. (Ellis 2002: 147) Speakers/listeners remember (aspects of) tokens/exemplars and "place them" into a multidimensional space/network (cf. Pierrehumbert 2003). As indicated above, the distributional aspects to be remembered are various and involve phonetic, phonological, prosodic, morphemic, lexical (co-)occurrence and extra-linguistic/ contextual aspects including utterance context (e.g. the incongruity implication of the What's-X-Doing-Y construction), sociolinguistic speaker factors, and information about register/genre/mode. Exemplars which are identical to an already memorized exemplar (at the available level of granularity) strengthen the existing exemplar's representation. Exemplars which are similar/dissimilar to each other are close to/far from each other respectively, and categorization of a new exemplar proceeds on the basis of multidimensional spatial proximity to clouds of already memorized exemplars. �is does not mean that speakers/listeners remember each exemplar and everything about it: (aspects of) memories of individual exemplars may not be accessible because they may decay, be generalized over, or never make it into long-term memory.
�e appealing aspects of this model, its implications, and its compatibility with CL are manifold: it explains �rst language acquisition without recourse to largely untestable parameters etc., a topic about which much of CL proper has had little to say. It "embodies" our knowledge that speakers/listeners store immense amounts of probabilistic information, and the assumption of clouds of remembered exemplars models all kinds of frequency e�ects: high frequencies of (co-) occurrence correspond to particularly dense clouds with many di�erent points in close proximity (from di�erent angles). �at in turn means that this kind of approach can easily account for categorization/prototype e�ects, di�erences between native speakers of the same language, and register or other contextual effects, which merely become additional dimensions of variation.
there is a major convergence of research from many di�erent perspectives -corpusbased analysis, computational linguistics, discourse, cognitive and functional linguistics, and psycholinguistics -that all point to a new theory of grammar with its attendant theory of language acquisition. (Bybee 2002: 215) 3. Wrapping up I made a few minor proposals, which included the proposal to maybe rethink the contrast of corpus-driven and corpus-based linguistics, and to de�nitely rethink the us vs. them hijacking warfare. However, my main focus was something else: First, I wanted to − discuss reasons why some part of theoretical linguistics and some part of CL have so far not yet entered into the kind of fruitful relation I would like to see more; − explain why I think that this gap should be closed at a much faster pace; − show that much of CL is extremely compatible with developments in CogLing/ Construction Grammar and with some psycholinguistic theories/models, and that these theories can help CL answer why-questions in a better way than the humanistic hermeneutic-circle meaning-in-discourses-is-negotiated-by-thecommunity way upheld by some.
�us, my main proposal is for us corpus linguists to assume as the main theoretical framework within which to explain and embed our analyses a psycholinguistically informed, (cognitively-inspired) usage-based linguistics. �ankfully, I am not alone in this. �ere are some linguists who have assumed similar positions already (Schönefeld 1999 , Schmid 2000 , Mukherjee 2004 , and Butler 2004 , for instance), but the major breakthrough I would hope for has not yet happened. �e from my point of view most important arguments in a very similar spirit are from Miller and Charles as well as Hoey. For example, Miller and Charles's work on near synonymy and antonymy (e.g. Miller & Charles 1991: 26) involves the notion of a contextual representation, "a mental representation of the contexts in which the word occurs, a representation that includes all of the syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and stylistic information required to use the word appropriately", but even more �tting is one of my favorite quotes from Hoey (2005: 11) :
the mind has a mental concordance of every word it has encountered, a concordance that has been richly glossed for social, physical, discoursal, generic and interpersonal context.
[…] all kinds of patterns, including collocational patterns, are available for use It's time to �nally recognize this connection between corpus linguistics, cognitive linguistics, and psycholinguistics…
